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Suspected Chinese Espionage Group Exploited VMware vCenter Zero-Day for Over Two Months
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A suspected China-linked espionage group spent more than two months quietly exploiting an unpatched VMware vCenter Server vulnerability before the flaw was publicly disclosed, according to new research from Mandiant and Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG). The attackers used the bug to seize administrator control of vCenter and pull sensitive files out of at least one victim’s virtual machines.

Google’s investigators attribute the intrusion to a group they track as ARMORY CASTLE, previously known as UNC5221. Broadcom, which owns VMware, disclosed the underlying flaw — tracked as CVE-2026-123890 — on November 19, more than two months after Mandiant’s investigation places the earliest confirmed exploitation in early September. The vulnerability carries a near-maximum severity score of 9.8 out of 10.

A Flaw That Hands Over the Keys

The bug lives in VMware Directory Service, the component behind vCenter’s single sign-on system. Anyone able to reach a vulnerable server over the network can bypass authentication entirely and open an administrator session for the built-in vSphere account — no password required. In the case Mandiant examined, the attackers were already inside the target’s network when they reached the vulnerable vCenter instance.

That detail underscores why vCenter compromises are so consequential: it’s the central console for managing an organization’s entire VMware virtualization layer. ESXi hosts run the actual virtual machines, but vCenter is what lets administrators control those hosts and everything running on them. A successful attack against it can put a large number of systems at risk at once, regardless of how well-defended the individual virtual machines are.

From a Support Tool to a Hypervisor Breach

The intrusion didn’t start with VMware at all. Mandiant traces the initial foothold to a separate zero-day, CVE-2026-102764, in BeyondTrust Remote Support software, exploited as early as late August. From there, the attackers moved laterally to an internal Linux appliance that had no endpoint detection software running on it, gained root access, and began hunting for VMware infrastructure to escalate into.

Once they located a vulnerable vCenter server — one that had already been patched against a different, previously disclosed authentication bypass from July (CVE-2026-59309) — the attackers deployed a custom tool investigators have named BONESAW. BONESAW copied the vCenter directory database and created a brand-new single sign-on administrator account for the intruders to use. A second tool, dubbed SAWSNAKE, used stolen cryptographic signing keys to forge SAML authentication tokens, effectively letting the attackers impersonate a legitimate administrator without ever going through a normal sign-in or multifactor challenge.

Reaching Inside the Virtual Machines

With that level of access, the group stole vCenter’s encryption material and database credentials, then used them to reach an ESXi host directly. From there, investigators observed the attackers reading files out of a Windows virtual machine’s disk — including Active Directory data, registry files, and DNS records — without ever touching the guest operating system itself. Because that kind of access happens at the hypervisor level, security tools running inside the Windows VM would have had no visibility into it. The stolen archive was then moved back out through the same compromised Linux appliance, which Mandiant believes served as the exfiltration path.

Patches Are Available, But Gaps Remain

Broadcom’s advisory, VMSA-2026-0009, lists fixed versions: vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200, and 8.0 Update 3m, along with guidance for VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x customers to move to 5.2.5. Notably, there is no public patch for vCenter 7.0 — Broadcom is directing customers still on that version, if they hold extended support contracts, to contact support directly. There is no workaround beyond that.

Security teams are advised to treat patching as only the first step. Because the attackers created rogue administrator accounts and forged authentication tokens, simply installing the update won’t remove any backdoor access already established. Mandiant recommends preserving and reviewing logs across vCenter, ESXi, and any connected remote-support appliances for signs of unexpected administrator accounts, unexplained SSH activity, new ESXi root SSH keys, and unusual reads of virtual disk files — and, where compromise is confirmed, revoking sessions, rotating signing keys and credentials, and assessing whether stolen Active Directory data puts the broader Windows domain at risk.

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