US trucking and logistics companies are being targeted by three distinct, highly tailored cybercrime campaigns that disguise themselves as the unglamorous paperwork of the freight business — carrier verification, broker onboarding, and load-board bookings — according to new research from ANY.RUN. Tracked as HelloFriends, NodeRemote, and Fake Freight Portals, each campaign turns an everyday industry interaction into an opening for credential theft, malware installation, or outright remote control of company systems.
HelloFriends: Cloned Regulator Pages That Harvest SSNs and Fuel-Card Logins
The largest of the three operations by sheer infrastructure, HelloFriends, impersonates the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). ANY.RUN has linked roughly 1,430 domains to the campaign over the course of 2026 alone. What makes it especially convincing is its personalization: phishing emails name the specific target carrier and include its real USDOT number, and because the sending domains are fully controlled by the attackers, the messages legitimately pass SPF, DKIM, and DMARC authentication checks — the very mechanisms meant to catch spoofed email.
Victims clicking through land on convincing clones of the SAFER and Motus regulatory portals, which display genuine carrier records alongside a fabricated “NOT AUTHORIZED” warning designed to create urgency. From there, the scam escalates in carefully sequenced stages: victims are asked for their Social Security number, EIN, and date of birth under the pretext of a $300 “administrative fee,” then prompted to “connect” a fuel-card provider such as Relay, Comdata, WEX, EFS, or Fleet One. In observed cases targeting Relay and Comdata accounts, the fake login page deliberately rejects the first password entered, prompting the victim to type in a second one — a trick that maximizes the odds of capturing a real, usable credential. Finally, the site requests a one-time SMS or six-digit code, which converts the stolen password into an immediately usable account. The stolen data is relayed to Telegram through server functions hosted on Vercel, with internal message labels that researchers say read simply “FULL OBJECT” and “Hello Friends.”
NodeRemote: Broker Paperwork That Installs a Self-Healing Backdoor
The second campaign, NodeRemote, goes after dispatch teams and freight brokers directly, using fake onboarding pages, bills of lading, insurance claims, and rate confirmations as bait. One variant uses a fake reCAPTCHA prompt that silently copies a PowerShell command to the clipboard and instructs the victim to paste it into the Windows Run dialog — a so-called “ClickFix” social-engineering technique. Other versions deliver VBS scripts disguised as ordinary business documents, and as of November 2026, researchers spotted a new variant using an MSI installer pushed through a fake load-tracking lure.
Once triggered, the infection chain installs a Node.js runtime alongside an obfuscated backdoor, persisting through scheduled tasks bearing names like NodeRemote{GUID}. What stands out is the backdoor’s resilience: it looks up its command-and-control servers from three independent sources simultaneously — a BNB Smart Chain contract, an encrypted DNS TXT record fetched over DNS-over-HTTPS, and a GitHub gist — letting its operators swap infrastructure at will without pushing any new malware to infected machines. Between October 25 and November 3 alone, researchers observed six of twelve tracked relay endpoints get replaced. A companion tool attempts to bypass Windows User Account Control through the fodhelper.exe and ComputerDefaults.exe binaries. As researchers note, a single compromised dispatch workstation can be enough to expose an organization’s broker portals, load boards, and email all at once.
Fake Freight Portals: From “Terms and Conditions” to a Full Remote-Access Trojan
The third campaign clones the TIMOCOM and DAT freight and load-board platforms, luring visitors to review “updated terms and conditions” or download booking paperwork. Clicking a “View PDF” link opens a WebDAV network share containing a file named terms_and_conditions.pdf.lnk — actually a Windows shortcut disguised as a PDF, which launches an executable hosted on the remote server.
That executable installs MeshCentral, a legitimate open-source remote administration tool, giving the attacker hands-on access to the victim machine. From there, operators have been observed retrieving BitLocker recovery passwords via the built-in manage-bde utility, adding Microsoft Defender exclusions for user folders and the malicious payload itself, and ultimately deploying CastleRAT — also tracked under the name NightshadeC2 — before relaunching it with elevated privileges through a UAC bypass. CastleRAT notably uses a Steam Community user profile as a dead-drop resolver to locate its command server, a technique that blends its traffic in with ordinary gaming activity. Earlier waves of this same campaign, observed in May 2026, relied on the legitimate NetSupport Manager tool instead. Researchers did not observe file encryption in any of the cases reviewed, but note that the combination of captured BitLocker keys, disabled endpoint defenses, and persistent remote access gives attackers everything they would need to escalate into a much more damaging incident at a moment of their choosing.
A Shared Lesson: Routine Business Is the New Attack Surface
All three campaigns succeed by exploiting the same basic fact: carrier verification, broker onboarding, and load bookings are necessary, routine, and time-pressured activities for logistics companies, which makes staff less likely to scrutinize them closely. Security teams in the sector are advised to validate FMCSA- and carrier-portal communications through a separate, known channel before entering any sensitive data, train dispatch and brokerage staff to recognize ClickFix-style “paste this into Run” prompts, and treat unexpected WebDAV-hosted “PDF” shortcuts or MSI installers delivered via freight paperwork as a red flag rather than routine correspondence.
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